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Key Drivers of Successful Implementation of an Employee Suggestion-Driven Improvement 
Program 
 
Abstract   
Service organizations frequently implement improvement programs to increase quality.  These programs 
often rely on employees’ suggestions about improvement opportunities.  Organizations face a trade-off 
with such suggestion-driven improvement programs. On one hand, the improvement literature 
recommends that managers focus organizational resources on surfacing a large number of problems, 
prioritizing these, and selecting a small set of high priority ones for solution efforts.  The theory is that 
soliciting a large number of ideas from employees will surface a set of higher priority problems than 
would have been identified with a less extensive search.  Scarce organizational resources can be allocated 
to resolving the set of problems that provide the greatest improvement in performance.  We call this an 
“analysis-oriented” approach.  On the other hand, managers can allocate improvement resources to 
addressing problems raised by frontline staff, regardless of priority ranking.  This “action-oriented” 
approach enables more resources to be spent on resolving problems because prioritization receives less 
attention.  To our knowledge, this tradeoff between analysis and action in process improvement programs 
has not been empirically examined. To fill this gap, we randomly selected 20 hospitals to implement an 
18-month long employee suggestion-driven improvement program; 58 work areas participated. Our study 
finds that an action-oriented approach was associated with higher perceived improvement in performance, 
while an analysis-oriented approach was not.  Our study suggests that the analysis-oriented approach 
negatively impacted employees’ perceptions of improvement because it solicited, but not act on, 
employees’ ideas.  We discuss the conditions under which this might be the case. 
  
1. Introduction 
Process improvement programs can create a competitive advantage for organizations (Loch et al., 
2003).  Organizations often utilize frontline staff’s suggestions about improvement opportunities as an 
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input for process improvement programs (Imai, 1986, Parker et al., 1997).  However, despite their 
intuitive appeal and popular following, employee suggestion-based improvement programs have 
produced mixed empirical results (Harlos, 2001).  For example, three studies of the employee suggestion-
based improvement program that we study in this paper found that the program led to positive change in 
organizational climate (Benning et al., 2011, Frankel et al., 2008, Thomas et al., 2005), while another two 
studies found that basically the same program had a negative impact on climate (Benning et al., 2011, 
Singer et al., forthcoming). This paper attempts to resolve these conflicting findings by identifying the 
conditions under which the program was most effective.   
In particular, we examine a tradeoff in how managers implement the program.  The tradeoff involves 
choosing whether to allocate resources to identify and prioritize problems with the goal of solving the 
highest priority problems versus to allocate resources to resolve problems with the goal of addressing as 
many as possible.  The tradeoff arises because identifying and prioritizing problems requires resources, 
which otherwise could be used to address already known problems (Wachter, 2009).  Furthermore, 
suggestion-based programs can surface more problems than the organization can solve with its limited 
human and financial resources (Frankel, et al., 2008, Repenning and Sterman, 2002).  The resource 
shortfall creates an allocation decision between resolving a smaller number of higher priority problems 
and resolving a larger number of lower priority problems.   
Managers can focus resources on generating as many improvement ideas as possible, even if the 
organization doesn’t have enough problem-solving capacity to address all of them.  This approach may be 
beneficial because having a large number of ideas enables analysis of frequency and severity (Leape, 
2002).  Using these data, the most important problems can be identified and prioritized for solution efforts 
(Bagian et al., 2001). This analysis-oriented approach enables the organization’s resources to be used for 
resolving the highest priority problems.  Furthermore, this approach may increase managerial confidence 
in the program because problems that are addressed emerge from a large number of ideas submitted by a 
cross section of employees rather than from a potentially idiosyncratic concern raised by one employee.   
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In contrast, managers can focus resources on solving problems rather than on surfacing and 
prioritizing them.  This can be accomplished by addressing issues as they emerge with little emphasis on 
using prioritization scores as a filtering mechanism (Johnson, 2003, Repenning and Sterman, 2002).  An 
action-oriented approach may be beneficial because prioritizing problems consumes substantial resources 
that could instead be diverted to addressing problems (Wachter, 2009).  In addition to the direct impact, 
an action-orientation may have an added benefit of increasing employees’ motivation.  Prior research has 
found that frontline staff more willingly engage in the discretionary behaviors required for process 
improvement if they believe that managers will act on their ideas (Gandhi et al., 2005, Morrison and 
Phelps, 1999).  Furthermore, research on accidents has found that small problems combine to cause major 
accidents, and that it is difficult to know in advance which problems will be involved in the next accident 
(Reason, 1990).  This research calls into question the possibility of using analysis to accurately prioritize 
problems with regard to safety.  Finally, solving problems as they are identified limits the number of 
unsolved, identified problems to align with available problem solving resources.  This may prevent the 
unproductive firefighting syndrome where a long queue of unresolved issues creates pressure to patch 
problems rather than to remove underlying causes (Bohn, 2000).  In summary, resources may be better 
spent solving known problems rather than identifying a large set of problems and limiting solution to the 
small subset with the highest expected impact (Johnson, 2003).   
This paper tests hypotheses on this tradeoff between an analysis-oriented versus an action-oriented 
approach using data from service organizations’ implementation of a popular employee suggestion 
program.  The program is commonly referred to as “Management-By-Walking-Around” (MBWA)  
(Peters and Waterman, 1982).  MBWA involves senior managers visiting their organization’s frontlines to 
observe and talk with employees while they do their work. The intention is that managers and frontline 
staff will work together to identify and resolve obstacles to efficiency, quality or safety (Frankel et al., 
2003, Luria and Morag, 2012, Peters and Waterman, 1982).  The program has been adopted in many 
settings including semiconductor manufacturing (Luria and Morag, 2012), schools (Sagor and Barnett, 
1994), and hospitals (Benning, et al., 2011, Benning, et al., 2011, Frankel et al., 2003).  It is theorized to 
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improve performance through two levers.  First, it is a visible sign of managers’ commitment to the 
improvement program, which in turn motivates employee engagement in the discretionary activities 
required for improvement (Beer, 2003, Luria and Morag, 2012).  Second, improvement occurs when 
problems raised by frontline employees are addressed (Frankel, et al., 2003, Pronovost et al., 2004). 
We examine the tradeoff between analysis and action among 58 work groups in 20 organizations that 
were randomly selected to conduct an MBWA-based program. We exploit variation in their 
implementation and performance to better understand the approach that resulted in positive performance.  
In doing so, this paper answers the call for research to examine the drivers of successful (or unsuccessful) 
implementation of improvement programs (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011, Nembhard et al., 2009).   
We used a perceptual measure of performance, perceived improvement in performance (PIP), as our 
outcome variable. Four reasons support this choice.  First, MBWA-based programs have been shown to 
impact organizational climate, which is an important driver of performance (Benning, et al., 2011).  
Second, perceptions of climate are an important outcome in their own right because they influence 
employee behaviors, which in turn impact objective measures (Zohar et al., 2007).  Third, the objective of 
this MBWA-based program was safety, which is challenging to measure objectively because by definition 
safety implies the absence of problems (Gaba 2003).  Employee perceptions are a reliable source of 
information about process quality because employees are close to the work and know if system failures 
are becoming less frequent.  For example, research has found that nurses’ perceptions of safety culture are 
associated with safety outcomes, such as mortality, readmissions, and other objective performance 
outcomes, such as length of stay (Hansen et al., 2010, Hofmann and Mark, 2006, Huang et al., 2010, 
Rogers et al., 2010, Singer et al., 2009)).  Fourth, the use of a perceptual measure was necessary as the 
hospitals were unwilling to share confidential data about clinical outcomes or safety incidents with us. 
We find that an action-oriented approach to the MBWA-based program was associated with improved 
PIP.  The action-oriented approach was manifested by a higher percentage of solved problems that were 
considered “easy” to solve, which enabled more problems to be addressed with the same set of human and 
organizational resources.  In contrast, the analysis-oriented approach, as characterized by identifying and 
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solving higher priority problems, was not associated with improved PIP.  Our results thus call into 
question the general applicability of advice recommending an analysis-oriented approach where a large 
number of problems are identified, prioritized and only the highest priority ones are selected for 
resolution. We propose that using an analysis-oriented approach may not be beneficial when the problem 
landscape has many small to medium priority problems and few high priority ones, as we believe is the 
case in our study.   
 
2. Analysis-Oriented versus Action-Oriented Approaches to Process Improvement 
Process improvement programs can yield variable results, with some organizations showing success 
and others failure (Choi and Behling, 1997). This study examines variation in implementation success for 
one MBWA-based program.  We examine the impact of an analysis-orientated versus action-oriented 
approach to implementing the MBWA-based program during each of two key steps in the process 
improvement process: problem identification and problem selection. We first consider problem 
identification. 
 
2.1. The Effect of Implementation Approach during Problem Identification 
According to innovation theory, an analysis-oriented approach to problem identification is preferable.  
Generating a larger set of ideas, it is argued, will result in a higher value for the best idea (Girotra et al., 
2010).  This outcome is beneficial in situations like product development tournaments where significant 
investment is required to bring an idea through the entire development process.  Organizations typically 
do not have enough resources to simultaneously develop multiple ideas and therefore selecting the highest 
potential impact ideas is important.  Furthermore, success can be achieved through one innovative idea 
that is forwarded through the process to become a new blockbuster product.  Thus, in the product 
development context, success ultimately depends on finding and developing one or two blockbuster ideas 
(Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009).   
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Similarly, service organizations have limited resources for process improvement.  Identifying the 
problems whose resolution offers the highest potential benefit and assigning these problems the highest 
priority is a key recommendation in the improvement literature (Juran and Gyrna, 1980).  The rationale is 
that organizations benefit from surfacing a large number of problems and identifying higher value 
problems that, if selected and resolved, would yield the largest performance increases (Bagian et al., 
1999). We propose that a work area’s ability to identify high priority problems, a characteristic of an 
analysis-oriented approach, positively impacts PIP.     
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The greater the value of the highest-valued identified problem, the greater a 
work area’s perceived improvement in performance.   
 
An action-oriented approach emphasizes solving multiple identified problems.  The underlying 
assumption is that organizations benefit by solving as many problems as possible, no matter how small. 
This approach thus encourages identification of problems that are easy-to-solve because this enables the 
resolution of more problems given the same level of organizational resources (Bohn, 2000).  
Organizations have been able to improve performance by identifying simple problems that can be easily 
solved (Thompson et al., 2003), which suggests that this is a viable approach to process improvement.  
An action-oriented approach is typical of lean production systems, which encourage employees to bring 
issues that interfere with production to their manager’s attention by pulling an andon cord, even if the 
employee and manager can quickly resolve the issue (Liker, 2004).  Lean organizations value 
identification of problems, even those that are easy-to-solve, because managers believe that solving them 
leads to improvement. Thus, we propose that a work area’s ability to identify easy-to-solve problems, a 
characteristic of an action-oriented approach to process improvement, positively impacts PIP. 
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Hypothesis 1b (H1b): The greater the percentage of identified problems that are easy-to-solve, the 
greater a work areas’ perceived improvement in performance.  
  
2.2. The Effect of Implementation Approach during Problem Selection 
We now develop prescriptive hypotheses about which types of problems should be selected for 
resolution efforts if the goal is to increase PIP.  A significant challenge of suggestion-based programs is 
that they can surface more problems than an organization can solve given its limited human and financial 
resources (Bohn, 2000, Frankel, et al., 2008, Repenning and Sterman, 2002).  Organizations face a 
tradeoff between spending resources on the process improvement task of selecting problems (e.g., the 
activities to decide which problems to address) versus on the task of solving problems. On one hand, 
managers can focus resources on prioritizing among large numbers of improvement ideas with the goal of 
solving the highest priority problems. For example, a priority score for each problem can be determined 
by multiplying its potential severity by its frequency of occurrence (Bagian, et al., 1999, Frankel et al., 
2005).  Using these calculations, higher priority problems can be detected and selected for solution efforts 
(Bagian, et al., 2001).  Selection continues until problem solving resources are depleted or there are no 
more unsolved problems that scored high enough to warrant solution. This is characteristic of an analysis-
oriented approach.  This approach is similar to innovation tournaments, in which success is driven by a 
few high impact ideas that get through the development process and become blockbuster products 
(Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009).  
Service organizations commonly use an analysis-oriented approach to problem selection, as 
illustrated by the widespread adoption of incident reporting systems as a primary tool for improving 
safety in aviation and healthcare (Milch et al., 2006). The Aviation Safety Reporting System operated by 
NASA and the safety improvements it has provoked has been credited in part for the 65% reduction in 
fatal airplane crashes to one in 4.5 million in the decade ending 2007.  Incident reporting systems are a 
key component of hospitals’ patient safety systems, and have been endorsed by the Institute of Medicine 
(1999) and the Department of Health and Human Services (Levinson, 2010).  A survey of 2,050 US 
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hospitals found that 98% had incident reporting systems (Farley et al., 2008).  In incident reporting 
systems, hospitals encourage staff to report situations that did or could have led to patient harm. These 
reports are analyzed for trends and the most significant issues are resolved (Milch, et al., 2006, Nuckels et 
al., 2007).  The program’s focus tends toward extensive identification, analysis and prioritization; not all 
problems receive resolution efforts (Ramanujam et al., 2008, Wachter, 2009).   
The primary benefit of an analysis-oriented approach is that the process ensures that scarce problem 
solving resources will be allocated to the set of problems predicted to yield the greatest impact.  A 
consequence is that problems with low priority scores are identified, but not resolved.  This may be 
beneficial because discarding low priority problems prevents the queue of unsolved problems from 
growing unmanageably long (Bohn, 2000).  We hypothesize that an analysis-oriented approach to 
problem selection, as indicated by solving the highest priority problems, is associated with improved PIP. 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Work areas that resolve a higher percentage of high priority problems will 
have more perceived improvement in performance than work areas that solve a lower percentage of high 
priority problems.   
 
On the other hand, managers can maximize resources allocated to resolving problems by addressing 
problems as they are identified rather than first conducting prioritization analysis.  An action-oriented 
approach to selecting problems to resolve is characterized by spending the majority of improvement 
resources addressing problems rather than analyzing them.  The benefit of an action-oriented approach 
stems from the cumulative payoff of solving many small-scale problems.  It is akin to the long tail 
principle that derives from studies of the retail sector. Scholars suggest that on-line retailers can achieve 
substantial profits by selling a large number of niche items that have small sales volume individually, but 
collectively add up to a large cumulative sales volume (Anderson, 2004, Brynjolfsson et al., 2011).  The 
organizational learning literature discusses a similar tradeoff between devoting resources to exploring 
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new opportunities that have a high potential payoff versus exploiting existing, known opportunities with 
incremental payoffs (March, 1991).  
We propose that an action-oriented approach is fruitful for increasing PIP for four reasons. First, 
research on improvement has found that employees stop identifying and trying to resolve issues 
themselves when senior managers fail to take action on known problems (MacDuffie, 1997).  Conversely, 
employees are more willing to engage in the discretionary behaviors required for improvement if they 
believe that managers will act on, rather than simply study, their ideas (Gandhi, et al., 2005, Morrison and 
Phelps, 1999). Thus, there is a hidden psychological cost of the analysis-oriented approach of asking 
employees for ideas that are subsequently disregarded.  Not solving ideas that the organization has 
solicited may lead to cynicism and a lack of participation in future efforts (Clarke, 1999, Tucker, 2007).  
Second, the pressure of having identified more problems than can be resolved can create an 
unproductive firefighting culture where problems are patched rather than fully resolved, so their 
underlying causes are never addressed (Bohn, 2000).  The queue of problems awaiting resolution can be 
shortened by addressing easy-to-solve problems first.  
Third, research has found that major accidents typically result from an unpredictable combination of 
small magnitude problems rather than from a single large magnitude problem (Perrow, 1984, Reason, 
2000).  According to the “Swiss Cheese Theory,” accidents occur when errors remain unaddressed 
because of latent weaknesses—represented by holes in a piece of cheese—in multiple defensive layers 
(each represented by a slice of cheese) and reach the patient (Cook and Woods, 1994, Reason, 2000).  It 
therefore can be beneficial to resolve what appear to be low priority problems because it is difficult to 
predict which problems will align to contribute to the next accident (Perrow, 1984).   
Fourth, improvement requires resolving problems, but an analysis-oriented approach can expend 
significant managerial and financial resources on analyzing rather than resolving problems (Johnson, 
2003).  For example, the U.S. Aviation Safety Reporting System spent an average of $100 per report on 
analysis alone (Johnson, 2003).  Similarly, a hospital physician estimated that his institution spent $1.6 
million per year managing incident reports, with the bulk spent on analysis rather than resolution 
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(Wachter, 2009).  With an action-oriented approach, this money would be spent on addressing problems 
rather than analyzing them. For these reasons, we hypothesize that an action-oriented approach—
characterized by resolving many easier-to-solve problems—will be associated with improved PIP.   
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Work areas that resolve a higher percentage of easier-to-solve problems will 
have higher perceived improvement in performance than work areas that resolve a lower percentage of 
easier-to-solve problems.   
 
One method for facilitating either the analysis or action-oriented approach is to have managers ensure 
that problems selected for resolution efforts actually get resolved.  Regardless of whether an analysis or 
action-orientation is used, successful implementation of suggestion-based programs requires senior 
management commitment to problem resolution (Frankel, et al., 2005, Pronovost, et al., 2004).  This 
recommendation would seem to contradict the process improvement literature, which emphasizes the 
importance of having frontline employees involved in identifying and resolving issues (Jimmerson et al., 
2005).  However, research has found that senior managers can be helpful to frontline workers’ resolution 
efforts because they control financial resources needed to address issues that involve capital investment 
(Carroll et al., 2006).  They also possess the authority necessary to solve problems that cross 
organizational boundaries (Carroll, et al., 2006).  Furthermore, resolving problems requires time away 
from direct production responsibilities (Victor et al., 2000), which can be difficult for frontline 
employees. Senior managers can provide slack resources that provide the capacity for resolution 
(Edmondson, 2003). Thus, we hypothesize that assigning senior managers the responsibility of ensuring 
that a problem gets addressed will achieve better results.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Work areas that have a higher percentage of problems assigned to a senior 
manager to ensure resolution will exhibit greater perceived improvement in performance than those with 
a lower percentage of problems assigned to a senior manager. 
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3. Methodology 
We test our hypotheses in a field study of U.S. hospitals that were randomly selected to implement an 
MBWA-based improvement program. The program was launched in January 2005 and lasted for 18 
months. Hospitals are an appropriate context to study MBWA-based improvement programs because of 
the widespread adoption of such programs as a tool for improving patient safety (Frankel, et al., 2003).  
For example, over 79 hospitals in the United Kingdom have implemented the program (National Patient 
Safety Agency, 2011).  Furthermore, the importance of improving patient safety has been highlighted in 
several high profile reports (Institute of Medicine, 1999, Institute of Medicine, 2001). 
 
3.1. The MBWA-based Program 
We drew on prior research to design the MBWA-based program (Frankel, et al., 2008, Pronovost, et 
al., 2004, Thomas, et al., 2005).  The MBWA-based program consisted of repeated cycles of senior 
manager-staff interaction, debriefing, and follow up.  Senior managers, such as the Chief Executive, 
Operating, Medical, and Nursing Officers (CEO, COO, CMO, and CNO, respectively), interacted with 
frontline staff to generate, select, and solve improvement ideas. Their interactions took two forms: visits 
to the organizations’ frontlines to observe work, which were called “work system visits;” and special 
meetings, called “safety forums,” with larger groups of staff to discuss safety concerns. The two activities 
were conducted in the same work area, such as the emergency department. In work system visits, four 
senior managers would each spend 30 minutes to two hours visiting a particular work area to observe a 
person doing work. The senior managers would each observe a different process, such as medication 
administration, or person, such as a nurse or physician, to shed cross-disciplinary insight into the work 
done in the area. The purpose was to build senior managers’ understanding of the frontline work context 
and gather real-time, grounded information about safety problems (Frankel, et al., 2008).  In addition to 
the visits, managers also facilitated a safety forum in the work area. The safety forums were designed to 
enable a larger group of frontline workers from the work area to tell senior managers about their safety 
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concerns and points of pride (Sobo and Sadler, 2002). By supplementing work system visits with safety 
forums, the program addressed research suggesting that interaction with more frontline staff increased 
MBWA-based programs’ positive impact on culture (Thomas, et al., 2005).   
The MBWA-based program continued with a “debrief meeting,” which organized the information 
collected from the system visits and forum. The senior managers attended, as did the work area managers, 
selected frontline workers, and the hospital’s patient safety officer.  They compiled the improvement 
ideas identified through manager-staff interaction, discussed the ideas, in some cases prioritized them, and 
decided next steps, ranging from doing nothing to suggesting solutions and assigning responsibility. 
Managers were encouraged to communicate with staff about implementation efforts, describing what 
changes were made in response to identified ideas. The patient safety officers entered the ideas generated 
and actions taken into an electronic spreadsheet and sent it to our research team for analysis.   
Each round of activities constituted one cycle. Each cycle focused on a clinical work area of the 
hospital and took approximately three months to complete, which is comparable to the time reportedly 
required for improvement teams to solve problems (Evans and Dean, 2003, Pronovost, et al., 2004).  After 
completing a cycle, the management team would move to a different work area. The program focused on 
the following four work areas: operating room or post anesthesia care unit (OR/PACU), intensive care 
unit (ICU), emergency department (ED), and medical/surgical ward (Med/Surg). Senior management 
teams were able to customize the order in which they conducted the program. Cycles continued over the 
18-month implementation. On average, hospitals conducted cycles in 4 work areas. 
 
3.2. Recruitment 
Our study employed a quasi-experimental design, including a pretest and post-test of work areas. We 
drew a random sample of 24 US acute-care hospitals, stratified by size and geographic region. No 
financial incentives were provided; however, participation fulfilled a national accreditation requirement. 
Data on PIP were collected through surveys before implementation of program activities (2004) and again 
after the program was completed (2006). At each hospital, we surveyed a random 10% sample of frontline 
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workers, with additional oversampling in OR/PACUs, EDs, and ICUs in 2006 to improve sample size. 
The baseline (2004) response rate was 52%; the follow-up (2006) response rate was 39%. For the 
analyses in this paper, we used data from registered or licensed vocational nurses (n=417 in 2004 and 
n=433 in 2006). Twenty of the 24 treatment hospitals completed the improvement program in at least two 
work areas.  The four that did not complete the treatment dropped out because one went out of business, 
one was purchased by another organization, and two experienced significant senior management turnover. 
As a result, they were unable to complete more than one cycle of activities and did not provide data on 
ideas generated, selection, actions taken, and feedback provided to frontline workers, or the posttest 
survey. We thus excluded these hospitals from our analysis. There was no difference in PIP in 2004 
between the four types work areas targeted by the intervention in the four hospitals that dropped out of the 
treatment and in the 20 that did not (t = -.904, NS).  
   
3.3. Data and Measures  
Using a data collection spreadsheet that we provided, treatment work areas reported 1,245 patient-
safety problems that were identified during the visits and forums. Each row of the spreadsheet represented 
a unique safety concern. The columns included hospital name, work area, who participated in the MBWA 
activity, the problem, recommended actions for resolving the issue, what actions were taken, and who was 
responsible for ensuring the problem was resolved. Each hospital provided us with a list of the senior 
managers, which we used to determine whether a senior manager attended the program activity (e.g. work 
system visit or safety forum) and whether a senior manager was assigned responsibility for the problem.   
Work areas could use three columns to prioritize identified problems.  Work areas in eight hospitals 
filled out these columns. The first column was a rating of the problem’s safety risk on a scale from 1 to 
10, with 1 = low to no risk, 3 = mild discomfort, 5 = would require intervention, and 10 = could cause 
harm or death. The second column was frequency of occurrence, with 1 = Very unlikely (hasn't occurred 
yet to our knowledge); 2 = Possible (has been known to occur); 3 = Very likely (occurs regularly). The 
third column rated difficulty of solution, with 1 = easy, can be done within 30 days, 2 = moderate, 
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multiple departments’ approval required, 90 days; and 3 = difficult, multiple departments, process 
changes, and major budget, 6 months. 
3.3.1.  Independent Variables.  Following Frankel et al.’s method (2003), we calculated a priority 
score for each problem by multiplying the work area’s rating of the problem’s severity by its frequency.  
To test H1a, for each work area we created a variable, “mean priority top quartile identified”, that was the 
mean priority score of the top quartile of identified problems.  To do this, we first ordered the individual 
problems in a work area by their priority scores in descending order. If there were ties, problems that were 
solved were placed ahead of non-solved problems to ensure we gave credit to work areas for solving 
problems that might lie on the boundary of the top quartile. We also counted the total number of problems 
in the work area. We used this information to determine each problem’s priority percentile score. Next, 
we created a variable that was 1 if the problem was in the top quartile for priority percentile and missing 
otherwise. We multiplied the priority score by this top quartile dummy to get a new variable that was the 
priority score of the top quartile identified problems. Finally, we collapsed this variable to the work area 
level to calculate the mean priority score of top quartile of identified problems.  As an alternate test of 
H1a, we also created a variable for the highest priority score of the identified problems in the work area. 
To test H2a, we followed a similar process to create a variable, “% top quartile resolved,” that 
measured the percentage of the top quartile priority problems that were resolved.  To do this, in the 
dataset of individual problems, we generated a variable that was 1 if a problem was in the top quartile and 
resolved, 0 if it was in the top quartile and not resolved, and missing if the problem was not in the top 
quartile.  We then collapsed this variable in the individual problem data to the work area level to calculate 
the percentage of top quartile problems that were resolved. As an alternate test of H2a, we also created a 
variable, “Was top ranked problem resolved” that indicated whether or not the top ranked problem in the 
work area was resolved (1 = yes, 0 = no). The alternate specifications for H1a and H2a allowed us to 
more precisely test the prediction from the innovation literature that performance is driven by identifying 
and solving the highest magnitude idea (Girotra, et al., 2010).   
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To test H1b, we created a variable, “% identified that were easy-to-solve” that was the percentage of 
identified problems in a work area that were rated as easy to solve (a “1” on the difficulty of solution 
scale).  To test H2b, we generated another work area level variable, “% resolved problems that were easy-
to-solve” by calculating the percentage of the set of resolved problems in a work area that were rated as 
easy-to-solve.  
To test H3, we calculated the percentage of identified problems in the work area for which a senior 
manager was assigned responsibility to ensure that the problem was resolved. 
3.3.2. Outcome Measure. Our outcome measure was “change in PIP from 2004 to 2006.” The 
measure was derived from four survey items: “The quality of services I help provide is currently the best 
it has ever been;” “We are getting fewer complaints about our work;” “Overall, the level of patient safety 
at this facility is improving;” and “The overall quality of service at this facility is improving.”  Using a 5-
point Likert response scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, we asked respondents 
the extent to which they agreed with the items.  Agreement indicated that respondents thought quality and 
safety performance were improving. The scale exhibited high reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 
for the combined 2004 and 2006 individual-level, nurses-only data set (Nunnally, 1967).  
 The use of change scores is an appropriate method for testing change over time (Fitzmaurice, 2001).  
To create a change score for each work area, we first used the 2004 data and calculated for each nurse the 
mean for the four items. We then calculated the 2004 mean for each work area by averaging the mean 
scores of the nurses who worked in that work area. We repeated this process for the 2006 data. Then, we 
subtracted the each work area’s 2004 mean score from its 2006 mean score.  
We calculated intraclass correlations (ICC) and mean interrater agreement score (rWG) to test whether 
aggregation of PIP was appropriate. Significant intraclass correlations (ICC[1]=.06, F=5.69, p-value < 
.000, and ICC[2] = .82) supported aggregation (Bliese, 2000). The rWG for nurses’ rating of PIP was 0.60, 
which also was sufficient for aggregation (Zellmer-Bruhn, 2003). 
3.3.3.   Control Variables. To account for the fact that work areas with a low PIP in 2004 had more 
opportunity to achieve a large improvement in PIP, we included a dichotomous variable to indicate 
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whether PIP in 2004 was in the lower quartile (“bottom quartile 2004 PIP”) to control for the starting 
point, which was coded as a “1” for the bottom quartile of work areas in PIP in 2004 and a “0” for all 
others (Fitzmaurice, 2001).  This method enabled us to test for the change in PIP while also controlling 
for a low starting point.   
For testing H1a-b and H2a-b, our sample size was the 24 work areas that formally prioritized their 
problems using the coding scheme we had provided. As a result, for these hypotheses, we were limited in 
our ability to use non-significant control variables. However, our random selection of hospitals helps 
alleviate concerns that our model may be missing a variable that explains our results (Antonakis, 2010).  
We did not include control variables for unit type (e.g. ED, ICU, OR/PACU) as none were significant and 
their inclusion did not change our results.  We also tested for hospital-level control variables, such as 
teaching status, number of hospital beds, non-profit status and geographic region, but none of these were 
significant and their inclusion did not change our results.  
In our test of H3, we did not use any data from work areas’ ratings of problem severity, so our sample 
size included the full set of 58 intervention work areas. For testing this hypothesis, we were therefore able 
to include more control variables.  To better isolate the impact of a senior manager being assigned 
responsibility for problem resolution, we controlled for the percentage of problems within a work area 
that were resolved.  We created a variable “% of problems resolved” by first coding a problem as having 
had solution effort if there was evidence in the data set that action had been taken to address the problem.  
We also controlled for the fidelity of implementation with the following variables: the number of work 
system visits that were conducted in the work area, whether a work system visit was conducted by a 
senior manager (1=yes, 0=no), and whether a safety forum was conducted in the area (1=yes, 0=no).  
 
3.4. Testing of Hypotheses 
We used Stata 11.1™ to test our hypotheses. We used linear regression with robust standard errors 
and clustered by hospital (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt, 2004) with change in PIP as our outcome variable. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the residuals were normally distributed (V close to 1 and p>.10) 
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(Royston, 1992). Multicollinearity was also not an issue as all Variance Inflation Factors were well below 
the threshold of 10 (Chatterjee and Hadi, 1986).    
 
3.5. Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis.  
We visited each intervention hospital to observe prescribed activities, such as a work system visit or a 
safety forum. In addition, we discussed and observed specific examples of changes implemented in 
response to problems identified through the program to verify accuracy of the data submitted to us. There 
were no discrepancies. We also interviewed frontline staff, department managers, and the CEOs. 
Interview questions addressed the nature of performance improvement in the hospital in general and as it 
related to implementing the MBWA-based program. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. After each 
visit, investigators wrote a journal of the day’s activities from notes taken during the day. The journal and 
interviews were combined into a transcript, which provided qualitative data on the hospital’s 
improvement process. 
 
4. Results  
Intervention work areas implemented the MBWA-based program, as evidenced by the following 
statistics.  On average, the 58 work areas identified 19 problems and took action on 11.  Ninety-one 
percent had at least one work system visit; 79% had senior manager participation in a visit; and 48% 
conducted a safety forum. On average, senior managers were assigned responsibility for 10% of the 
identified problems.  The evidence also suggests that the identified problems were legitimate concerns.  
Using the subset of work areas that prioritized their problems, the mean priority score for all identified 
problems was seven.  As shown in Table 1, on average, the top quartile of identified problems had a mean 
priority score of 17 and the highest priority score, on average, was 19 (out of a maximum of 30).   
We found variation in the program’s effectiveness among intervention work areas. The bottom 
quartile of work areas experienced a decrease in PIP from a minimum drop of 0.375 points to a maximum 
drop of 2.25, or nearly half of the 5-point scale.  Of these 15 work areas, four were already below median 
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in 2004, suggesting this is not merely a regression to the mean effect.  The top quartile increased PIP by a 
minimum of .38 points to a maximum increase of 1.33.  Of these 13 work areas, three had above median 
PIP in 2004.  Given the large variation in results, we examined the analysis-orientation versus action-
orientation to explain implementation success.  Descriptive statistics and correlations for our main 
variables are shown in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.1.   Regression Results  
Model 1 in Table 2 shows the result from testing H1a and b, and H2 and b.  Identifying a top quartile 
of problems with higher average priority score was not associated with improved PIP (coefficient = .02, 
NS), nor was identifying a higher percentage of easy to solve problems (coefficient = -.60, NS).  Thus, 
problem identification does not appear to impact PIP and Hypotheses 1a and 1b are not supported.  Model 
1, however, does provide evidence for Hypothesis 2b.  A higher percentage of problems solved that were 
rated as “easy-to-solve” was associated with higher % change (coefficient = 1.00, p<.05).  A one standard 
deviation (27%) increase in the percentage of solved problems that were easy-to-solve resulted in a 1.0 
point increase in change in PIP, which was a 26% improvement (1/mean change in PIP of 3.77 = .26).  
The percentage of the top quartile priority problems that were solved was not significant (coefficient = -
.22, NS).  Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. Likewise, when we used the alternative method for 
specifying an analysis-orientation by including the highest priority score of identified problems 
(coefficient .02, NS) rather than the mean priority of the top quartile identified and whether the top ranked 
priority problem was resolved (coefficient -.01, NS) rather than the percentage of the top quartile priority 
problems, these variable were also not significant (Table 2). Thus, theory from the innovation literature 
suggesting that performance is driven by identifying and solving the highest magnitude idea was not 
supported. However, the percentage of problems resolved that were rated as “easy-to-solve” remained 
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significant (coefficient = .82, p<.01), though the percentage identified that were easy-to-solve remained 
non-significant (coefficient = -.45, NS).  Thus, it appears that an action-oriented approach that focuses on 
addressing problems that have been identified regardless of priority rating is more successful at increasing 
PIP than an analysis-oriented approach that seeks to identify and solve the high priority problems.      
An alternate explanation for our finding that an action-oriented approach was successful (H2b) could 
be that work areas were more successful because they spent more money on problem solving rather than 
because they allocated more of the same amount of money on action rather than analysis. To control for 
this potential “spend more” explanation, the authors individually rated the rough cost of each solved 
problem on a scale of 1 to 3 with 1=low (cost<= $500, low cost of solution), 2=medium 
(cost>$500<$150,000), and 3=high (cost>= $150,000) based on the description of what the work areas 
had done to solve the problem and independent research to check the cost of products or services whose 
costs could not be easily estimated. Examples of each class of solution cost are: for “1” apply a coating to 
one window to improve patient privacy; for “2” purchase new lighting in a catheterization laboratory to 
illuminate procedures; and for “3” hire several new personnel to address patient transportation needs. We 
compared scores and discussed our rationale until we reached consensus for all solved problems. We then 
summed the total estimated solution costs, estimating 1 = $250; 2=$5000; 3=$150,000, for all of the 
solved problems in each work area.  
Another possible explanation of H2b is that variation in quality of solution efforts (e.g. some work 
areas might have engaged in only superficial steps while others might have systematically resolved 
underlying causes) impacted the results. We also controlled for this “higher quality” explanation by hiring 
ten nurses not affiliated with the treatment hospitals to rate the solution effectiveness of each solved 
problem using a scale ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 being “no information given” and 10 being “systemic 
fix” that would prevent recurrence (scale is available from authors). Agreement on their ratings was fair 
(kappa = 0.23) (Landis and Koch, 1977).  The average rating for solution effectiveness was 5.9 for solved 
problems (“solution action in progress” on our scale) and 2.7 (“no solution implemented”) for unsolved 
problems, which validates their coding.  
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Given our small sample size, we omitted the analysis-oriented related variables in our testing of the 
cumulative cost and solution effectiveness variables. As Model 3 shows, the variable for the cumulative 
“cost of solving problems” was not significant (coefficient 0.00, NS). This may be because work areas 
could improve PIP without having to spend a lot of money on solutions.  Solution effectiveness was also 
not significant (coefficient = -.11, NS).  Percentage of solved problems that were easy-to-solve remained 
significant (coefficient = 1.22, p<.05), indicating that the results are similar after accounting for spending 
and solution effectiveness.  
The accumulation of evidence in these three models supports H2b, which had predicted that an 
action-oriented approach was associated with higher PIP than an analysis-orientation.  In our sample of 
work areas, it was more beneficial to solve a higher percentage of easy problems than high priority 
problems.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 shows the results from testing Hypothesis 3, which proposed that senior managers taking 
responsibility for ensuring that identified problems get resolved would be associated with higher PIP.  We 
controlled for the fidelity of implementation to ensure that poor results were not driven by a failure to 
implement the program (Nembhard, et al., 2009). Hypothesis 3 was supported (coefficient = .79, p<.05).  
Increasing the percent of problems assigned to senior managers by one standard deviation (23%) was 
associated with a 0.79 increase in PIP. This equates to a 21% increase in PIP (.79/3.76 = .21).  The 
variables testing fidelity to implementation were not significant in explaining a positive change in PIP.   
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4.2.   Robustness Checks 
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Other scholars have used a different approach for testing improvement over time, which is using the 
post measure as the outcome variable and the pre measure as a control variable (Fitzmaurice, 2001).  To 
make sure our results held using this approach, we also tested our hypotheses using 2006 PIP as the 
dependent variable (instead of the difference score) and 2004 PIP as a control variable (instead of the 
bottom quartile 2004 PIP).  By this method, the results were the same for all hypotheses (available from 
authors).  
 
4.3.   Qualitative Results 
To provide insight into the nature of implementation of MBWA-based programs, Table 4 presents 
qualitative data from the five work areas that improved the most on change in PIP and the five work areas 
that decreased the most.  On average, the difference in 2006 and 2004 PIP was .85 for the top five work 
areas and -1.4 for the bottom five. 
Examining the types of issues that were identified and the responses to these issues shows that the top 
work areas identified meaningful problems. Managers in turn took these problems seriously and 
addressed as many as possible.  For example, Hospital 88’s Med/Surg unit was one of the most improved 
work areas. One of the identified issues was that the small medication room prevented two nurses from 
preparing medications simultaneously, which was an inconvenience and delayed patient care. Senior 
managers discussed the issue with staff and they collectively made a plan to move the medication room to 
a larger space. The COO commented, “It’s a little thing, but when you actually see them doing the 
process, you say, ‘What a minute, that is difficult for them.’”  An interview with a staff nurse highlighted 
management’s general willingness to address issues.  She commented, “These people address safety 
issues. It may not always get addressed the way you want it to, but it still gets addressed.” 
Conversely, in work areas that deteriorated on PIP, an emphasis on prioritizing problems limited 
solution efforts. For example, Hospital 129’s ED identified important issues such as long lead times to 
receive lab results, which slowed patient flow through the work area and contributed to long wait times in 
the ED. However, in the safety forum we observed the manager spent the entire time getting staff input on 
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prioritizing the items (e.g. severity, frequency of occurrence, and ease of solution), leaving no time to 
discuss how the issues might be resolved.  This exemplifies the potential pitfalls of an analysis-oriented 
approach and suggests why an action-orientation may be preferable. This work area did not solve any 
problems, despite investing considerable time in identifying and prioritizing them. In other work areas 
that had the lowest % change scores, such as Hospital 34’s OR/PACU and Hospital 65’s ED, identified 
issues had to be validated by an external group, such as the hospital’s patient safety committee, before 
resolution efforts would be authorized. This extra analysis step created an additional hurdle for problems 
to be selected for improvement, substantially slowing the pace of change.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
We examined the tradeoff between service organizations’ orientation toward analysis versus action. 
Solving a higher percentage of the highest priority problems was not associated with increased PIP, while 
solving easy-to-solve problems was, lending support to the action-oriented approach. This signals the 
value of going after the “low-hanging fruit” rather than concentrating on the “big hits.”  In further support 
of an action-oriented approach, having senior managers assume responsibility for ensuring that problems 
get resolved was associated with increased PIP.  One explanation for this finding is that organizational 
change often requires senior managers to provide financial resources to pay for required equipment, 
materials, or labor; and organizational support to get an upstream department in the organization to 
change how they do their work as benefits might accrue downstream.  In other words, senior managers 
can help ensure that action happens. Given the improvement literature’s emphasis on empowering 
frontline employees to solve problems (Powell, 1995), our finding may be interpreted as highlighting the 
importance of empowering frontline employees to identify and solve problems while supporting those 
efforts by ensuring that organizational obstacles to improvement are removed.  Increasing senior 
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managers’ involvement with performance improvement programs can result in positive change if they 
facilitate action on identified issues. 
Our research finds little evidence that spending resources on an analysis-oriented approach is 
productive for improving PIP in hospitals.    
 
5.1. Implications for Theory on Approaches to Problem Solving 
Prior research has found an association between manager commitment and implementation success 
for performance improvement programs that rely on frontline employee participation, such as 6-sigma 
(Coronado and Antony, 2002), Scanlon plans (Miles, 1965, White, 1979), lean (Worley and Doolen, 
2006), and TQM (Antony et al., 2002). However, these studies were typically case studies of a few firms’ 
successful implementations or a survey used to correlate implementation success measures with 
managers’ self-reported commitment. Although these studies suggest a link between management 
commitment and implementation success, they provide limited insight into how to foster commitment and 
demonstrate it to frontline employees or why it is associated with success.  
In our study, we manipulated manager commitment by requiring senior managers to become involved 
in improvement efforts by visiting their frontlines to identify and resolve problems using an MBWA-
based program.  We found that managerial involvement was productive for some, but not all work areas. 
A possible explanation for our mixed results comes from Miles (1965). He postulated that managers held 
one of two beliefs about the value of interacting with employees. One belief was that interactions of 
senior managers with frontline staff were valuable because they increased frontline staff members’ 
morale, though the actual ideas generated were unhelpful.  Believing the “symbolic-value” of the 
interactions was not associated with improvement. The second belief, which was associated with better 
performance, was that these interactions were valuable because the ideas raised by frontline employees 
were useful. This belief in the value of interacting with frontline staff underlies a core principle of the 
Toyota Production System of respect for people (Liker, 2004). Miles’ study suggests that managers’ 
respect for frontline employees’ concerns may be an important moderator variable for manager 
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involvement in MBWA programs. An implication is that rather than designing interventions to increase 
manager involvement, it may be critical to first design interventions that surface and modify managers’ 
beliefs such that they value and therefore leverage the actual ideas raised by frontline staff.  
Another possible explanation of the positive impact of an action-orientation in our study is that the 
landscape of problem priority was relatively flat. In a flat landscape, local search is beneficial and 
expanded search efforts are unhelpful because the difference between a local high point and the global 
high point is too small to justify the increased search costs (Sommer and Loch, 2004). Spending resources 
to discover and solve only high impact problems through programs like MBWA or incident reports, may 
not yield sufficient improvement due to the lack of a disproportionately high priority problem that if 
solved would yield dramatic improvement.  Instead, substantial improvement might arise from solving the 
“lower tail” of problems that exist in a flat landscape (Brynjolfsson, et al., 2011).  Our findings call into 
question the assumption that there is always a small set of individual problems that have a 
disproportionately high priority score, as is assumed by performance improvement experts and forms the 
basis of their recommendation to limit solution efforts to the handful of highest priority problems (Juran 
et al., 1999).  An implication of our study is that little is gained from hospitals’ current focus on 
increasing reporting of safety concerns (Evans et al., 2007) because the expanded search is unlikely to 
yield significantly higher priority problems. Instead, hospitals would be better served by deploying their 
limited resources to solve existing problems (Wachter, 2009).  Our findings may be applicable to other 
organizations that have flat problem landscapes. We suspect that service industries that offer complex, 
customizable services co-created with customers, such as software, consulting, and legal industries, may 
have flat landscapes, but this remains a question for future research. Our findings might also apply to 
other improvement programs that rely on employee suggestions, which could result in flat problem 
landscapes, such as incident reporting systems and lean. 
 
5.2.   Implications for Practice 
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Many organizations’ strategies for improving quality begin by trying to increase employees’ reports 
of near misses and errors (Evans, et al., 2007).  The implied assumptions are that (1) increasing the 
number of reports enables organizations to conduct trend analysis that illuminates the most important 
problems which can then be solved; and (2) resources can be effectively matched with identified issues 
because many issues will be of sufficiently low priority that they can be ignored at low or no cost to the 
organization. In contrast, our study found that there may be little benefit to this approach.  Our study 
instead provides support for the lean community’s recommendation that organizations focus on 
developing capacity to address identified problems and taking action on problems (Imai, 1986).  Rather 
than seeking to increase reporting, organizations should instead seek to increase their problem-solving 
capacity, which will enable them to take action on an increased number of reports.  This recommendation 
is supported by prior research that found that underlying capabilities, such as problem-solving capacity, 
explained differences in organizational improvement (Adler et al., 2003).   
Related to the importance of first creating problem-solving capacity, our results suggest how MBWA-
based programs differ from the performance improvement technique of Kaizen.  Kaizen is a structured 
activity where workers are relieved of normal production responsibilities and use a standardized approach 
to identify and fix problems under guidance of a manager (Imai, 1986, Laraia et al., 1999).  This program 
is similar to MBWA; however, Kaizen events occur after managers and frontline staff are trained on 
standardized problem solving techniques so they have the ability to address the issues that arise (Imai, 
1986, Laraia, et al., 1999).  Kaizen also focuses on taking action to solve as many problems as possible in 
a given time frame. 
Organizations can increase problem-solving capacity through three routes. First, organizations can 
hire additional staff who are already skilled at performance improvement techniques (Bohn, 2000). 
Second, existing employees can be trained on these techniques. This has the added benefit of developing a 
common approach and language for improvement (Repenning and Sterman, 2002).  Third, a focus on 
resolving problems—even if they are small—will create additional capacity by spreading the techniques 
to those who interface with these efforts (Repenning and Sterman, 2002). To be successful, performance 
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improvement needs to be part of the regular work of organizations (Victor, et al., 2000).  Solving 
problems increases problem-solving capacity by spreading skills and knowledge through the organization 
(Adler, et al., 2003). Rather than viewing problem-solving capacity as a resource that is depleted with use, 
a better analogy might be a muscle that becomes stronger with use.  It is important to educate managers 
and employees to expect the “worse before better” dynamic that occurs when resources get diverted from 
production to improvement (Repenning and Sterman, 2002). However, over time performance should 
improve and capacity increase as employees become more skilled at performance improvement and 
contribute more meaningful ideas (Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001).  
 
5.3. Limitations 
Our findings must be considered in light of study limitations. First, our small sample size limited our 
analysis. We had a small sample size for several reasons. Given the cost and time intensive nature of 
conducting an experiment with hospitals over an 18-month period, it is difficult to conduct field-based, 
interventional experiments with samples larger than 20 to 30 organizations. Furthermore, some work 
areas were dropped from our analysis due to missing data in either 2004 or 2006, in part because concerns 
about survey overload caused hospital administrators to survey a random sample of only 10% of frontline 
workers.  In addition, despite our provision of a method of prioritizing identified problems, many 
organizations choose not to assign prioritization values and therefore work-area coded data on problem 
priority was not available for all work areas in our study.  Future research with larger sample sizes could 
test more nuanced theory.  For example, an action-oriented approach may be most successful for work 
areas that start from a weak position and therefore can benefit the most from action, whereas an analysis-
oriented approach may be most helpful for high performing work areas that can be more selective about 
finding the highest leverage opportunities.  
A second limitation is the perceptual measure of improvement. However, hospitals were unwilling to 
share actual safety incident measures with us.  In addition, publicly available measures, such as mortality 
and readmissions, are very blunt measures and, when we explored these relationships, they were not 
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significant in explaining variation in this study. Third, hospitals did not track how much they spent on 
solutions efforts and therefore estimation was the only way of testing the alternate explanation that 
spending more money on process improvement yielded better outcomes. Future research could contribute 
to improvement theory by examining the cost of improvement efforts compared to the benefits. A related 
limitation is the lack of data on quality of solution efforts.  
A fourth limitation is that we did not randomize action-oriented approach versus an analysis-oriented 
approach among the work areas.  Instead those differences emerged naturally.  A randomized assignment 
of the approaches would provide a stronger test of the hypotheses. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Understanding the impact of suggestion-based improvement programs is helpful for organizations 
that may be considering implementing them.  In our study of an MBWA-based improvement program, 
organizations whose managers ensured that problems were addressed achieved better results.  This 
suggests that improvement programs are more likely to change employees’ perceptions when they result 
in action being taken to resolve problems than when they are a symbolic show of manager interest.  Based 
on study findings, we recommend that organizations focus on increasing their capacity to act on 
improvement suggestions rather than generating suggestions and prioritizing them. 
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Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), and Correlations for Work Areas that had the MBWA intervention and Prioritized Problems (n=24)  
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Change in PIP .02 .53 -1.17 1.1      
 
2 Avg priority of top quartile identified 17.23 6.67 6 30 .298 1    
 
3 Highest priority score 18.75 7.43 6 30 .325 .952* 1   
 
4 % of identified problems that were easy to solve 36% 26% 0% 100% -.016 -.305 -.289 1  
 
5 % of top quartile problems solved 88% 29% 0% 100% .186 .091 .109 -.045 1 
 
6 Biggest priority problem was solved 88% 34% 0 1 .209 .11 .039 -.086 .799* 
 
7 % solved that were easy 33% 27% 0% 83% .327 .097 .099 .551* .432* .35 
* p<0.05 
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Table 2. Regression comparing change in PIP in treatment work areas (OR/PACU, ICU, ED, 
and Medical/Surgical) that rated the severity, frequency, and ease of solution of the problems, 
clustered by hospital with robust standard errors in parenthesis (n=24 work areas, 8 hospitals) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Outcome variable Change in PIP Change in PIP Change in PIP 
Bottom quartile 2004 PIP 
(1=yes) 
.39* (.16) .36^ (.19) .38* (.13) 
H1a. Mean priority top 
quartile identified  
.02 (.02) Not in model Not in model 
H1a. Highest priority score 
of identified problems 
Not in model .02 (.02) Not in model 
H1b. % identified that were 
easy-to-solve 
-.60 (.49) -.45 (.45) -.90^ (.42) 
H2a. % top quartile resolved -.22 (.23) Not in model Not in model 
H2a. Was top-ranked 
problem resolved (1=yes) 
Not in model -.01 (.26) Not in model 
H2b. % resolved problems 
that were “easy to solve” 
1.00* (.30) .82** (.21) 1.22* (.46) 
Cum cost of solving 
problems 
Not in model Not in model .00 (.00) 
Ave effectiveness of solution 
effort 
Not in model Not in model -.11 (.10) 
Constant -.25 (.48) -.47 (.46) .61 (.62) 
Observations 24 24 24 
Degrees of freedom F(5,7) F(5,7) F(5, 7) 
F statistic 10.99** 5.28* 7.08* 
Adjusted R-squared .06 .07 .08 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10 
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Table 3. Impact of the Percentage of Problems Assigned to Senior Managers on Change in PIP 
in treatment work areas (OR/PACU, ICU, ED, and Medical/Surgical) (n=58)  
 Model 1 
Outcome variable Change in PIP 
Bottom Quartile 2004 PIP (1=yes) .56** (.15) 
Percentage problems solved .12 (.33) 
Number of work system visits in the area -.04^ (.02) 
Senior manager participated in work system visit (1=yes) -.12 (.23) 
Safety forum in the area (1=yes) -.12 (.14) 
H3. % of problems assigned to senior managers for resolving .79* (.32) 
Constant -.08 (.31) 
Observations 58 
Degrees of freedom F(6, 19) 
F statistic 2.96* 
Adjusted R2 .10 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10 
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Table 4. Illustrative Problems, Solutions, and Quotes from Top and Bottom Five Work Areas 
Hosp 
ID 
Work 
Area 
2004  
Score 
2006 
Score 
Change 
in PIP  Examples Solution Efforts Illustrative CEO Quote about 
Prioritization 
116 OR/ 
PACU 
3.3 4.6 1.3 Need more clinic space Made new clinic rooms The associates will prioritize with the 
managers, who have a good idea of what 
the staff want to do. 
88 Med/ 
Surg 
3.6 4.7 1.1 Medication room is very small for 2 
people 
After discussing with staff, 
changed medication preparation to 
a larger room. 
These people address safety issues. It may 
not always get addressed the way you 
want it to, but it still gets addressed. 
39 ED 4.0 5.0 1.0 Feel like "dumping ground" when the 
clinic closes; Roof leaks, Need more 
blood pressure machines 
Relocated clinic in to expand ED 
patients; hired additional ED staff; 
fixed roof; provided blood 
pressure equipment 
Nurse almost gave wrong medication 
because two similar drugs next to each 
other in Pyxis. Told CNO. Pharmacist 
came up right away and changed drawer. 
100 Med/ 
Surg 
2.6 3.6 1.0 Newly diagnosed diabetic patients can't 
get glucometers from insurance; buy 
different kinds, hard for nurses to teach. 
Vendor donated glucometers, in-
serviced nurses, made kits for 
newly diagnosed diabetic patients 
Manager ordered new isolation carts to 
keep supplies for each patient outside the 
door to prevent spread of MRSA. 
47 ED 3.0 3.8 0.8 Need prompt response from pharmacy 
for selected meds; need lift equipment 
for obese patients; Pyxis# IT display 
disposed to medication errors 
Installed phone system with 
priority access to pharmacy; 
identified or added lift equipment; 
reprogrammed Pyxis IT display 
We understand what needs to be done - 
trying to get rid of verbal orders, trying to 
set up our Pyxis machine differently. 
122 OR/PA
CU 
5.0 3.9 -1.1 Keeping surgical equipment in order 
and performing, physician pressure to 
rush through certain protocols 
They have equipment checks and 
big push on sterilization, still 
working on this and discussing it 
in meetings.  
“A lot of people would say, ‘I don’t even 
know he is involved.’ But all of my 
administrative people are involved.” 
119 OR/ 
PACU 
3.8 2.6 -1.2 Need exhaust air, some equipment 
(chairs), back up of patients in ED, beds 
not ready 
Changes made to improve air, 
equipment ordered and others 
repaired, working on flow in ED 
It is hard to find the time and energy [to 
sustain this program] because there are 
other demands that pour in. 
34 OR/ 
PACU 
5.0 3.8 -1.3 OR table not safe for bariatric patients; 
insufficient checking of patient labs 
prior to surgery 
No solutions listed Anyone can submit safety idea to their 
vice-president. It gets sent out for review 
to applicable departments. 
129 ED 4.4 3.0 -1.4 Long lead times for radiology and lab, 
ties up rooms, long waits in ED, units 
not taking patients 
No solutions listed. Spent 30 minutes of safety forum deciding 
on priority scores with no discussion about 
what would correct the problems. 
65 ED 4.3 2.0 -2.3 Police bringing in dangerous patients 
with only two people on at night 
Talk to police department about 
patients, have security cameras 
and panic buttons 
You can't fix them all, but you have to 
prioritize. Our patient safety committee 
will end up doing that. 
# Pyxis ™ is an automated medication dispensing device used by nurses to administer medications to their patient 
 
